This paper investigates the ability of a fully harmonized carbon tax to curb carbon emissions in a globalized economy characterized by an uneven spatial distribution of heterogeneous firms. The level of the carbon tax matters for the direction of the relocation and its impact on global emissions. When the carbon tax is low enough, emissions are reduced as firms relocate to the smaller country to pay lower taxes by reducing their output. If the carbon tax is too high, then firms react by relocating to the larger country to maintain their export activity, so that the most environmentally friendly spatial configurations can be removed.
Introduction
Despite the growing number of policies aimed at reducing global warming, emissions grew more quickly between 2000 and 2010 than in any of the three previous decades (IPCC's Fifth Assessment Report, 2014). Annual greenhouse gas emissions have increased by precisely one gigatonne equivalent of dioxide carbon CO 2 (2.2%) over the past decade alone. 1 Such an increase in pollution poses the threat of a catastrophic increase in global temperatures, triggering strong reactions from, among others, several economists.
In fact, G. In other words, a global carbon tax would be an ideal instrument because it would address both domestic and transboundary pollution. The second main argument refers to the wellknown carbon leakage issue. In a globalized world, production activities can shift to countries with laxer environmental policies such that decentralized environmental policies are less e¤ective in reducing emissions. Hence, a global carbon tax is desirable because it would be neutral with respect to any delocalization strategy of …rms.
In this paper, we investigate the e¤ects of a global carbon tax and its ability to curb carbon emissions in a globalized economy characterized by an uneven spatial distribution of heterogeneous …rms. Our results challenge the claim that a global carbon tax could succeed in improving the quality of environment without raising competitiveness concerns. Indeed, we argue that although a global carbon tax is an attractive environmental measure, it may be subject to debate because, among other e¤ects, it can have a signi…cant impact on the location of (heterogeneous) …rms as well as on foreign trade patterns worldwide. We evaluate these e¤ects by 1 In comparison, greenhouse gas emissions grew on average by 0. Carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions are a byproduct of the production activity of manufacturing …rms, which we assume export part of their production. Therefore, our model accounts for the fact that CO 2 emissions, embodied in international trade, are an important contributing factor of the increase in emissions, especially in countries such as China (Ahmad and …rms are assumed to be either clean or dirty depending on the technology they adopt, with each technology associated with a speci…c level of production cost. It follows that a global carbon tax policy a¤ects the location choices of clean and dirty …rms in di¤erent ways. This framework allows for the analysis of the location decision of dirty and clean …rms, the e¤ect of a carbon tax on trade patterns and, …nally, the e¢ ciency of a global carbon tax in reducing global emissions. To focus on this subject, we abstract from all the political-economic factors that make a global carbon tax a public policy di¢ cult to implement.
By characterizing the location equilibria of heterogeneous …rms according to the level of trade costs, we …rst show that trade liberalization leads to more agglomeration in the larger country, which in turn raises global emissions. Thus, the need for a global carbon tax is becoming higher as trade costs fall. Nevertheless, when di¤erent market sizes and increasing returns to scale are considered, a carbon tax, even a global one, is not a spatially neutral policy instrument. We show that the implementation of a global carbon tax might have unexpected e¤ects on environmental quality because of the relocation e¤ects it generates. Speci…cally, a su¢ ciently low level of carbon has only positive e¤ects for the environment; it lowers pollution emissions in any equilibrium spatial con…gurations and induces spatial relocations that are less harmful for the environment. Furthermore, we show that there exists a threshold value of the carbon tax above which trade patterns are considerably a¤ected; in fact, …rms cease to trade in the foreign country. Importantly, we show that this situation is a dark side of the e¤ects of a global carbon tax because such a no-trade e¤ect may lead to the disappearance of the most environmentally friendly con…gurations.
Our contribution …rst relates to the literature on the pollution haven hypothesis, according to which pollution-intensive industries would move to countries with less stringent environmental regulation. Previous contributions generalize the model of reciprocal dumping by endogenizing the number of plants and their location (Markusen et al., 1993) . Firms can react to a tightening of environmental policies by shutting down the plant and transferring production to plants in another country 3 . As a consequence, the decentralization of the environmental policy leads government to behave non-cooperatively. Depending on the level of disutility associated with pollution, government either chooses a strategy of environmental dumping or a strategy of the type "Not In My Back Yard" (Markusen and al., 1995) . Zeng and Zhao (2009) develop a model in which manufacturing production generates cross-border pollution and location choices are driven by international di¤erences in both environmental policy and agglomeration forces. 4 The authors demonstrate that these manufacturing agglomeration forces alleviate the bene…ts of locating in a pollution haven. 5 We contribute to this literature by analyzing whether the centralization of environmental policy through a global carbon tax does avoid relocation e¤ects and further analyzing the ability of the tax to improve environmental quality.
This paper also contributes to the broad literature on the environmental impact of trade liberalization. Since the work of Grossman and Krueger (1993) , it has become well known that trade liberalization can a¤ect the environment through di¤erent channels. The question whether the overall impact will be positive or negative has given rise to many theoretical and empirical contributions (Sturm, 2003) . Antweiler, Copeland and Taylor (2001) consider pollution as a public bad and they develop a Ricardian model allowing both for income and factor endowment di¤erences across countries 6 . Their empirical results indicate that the overall impact of trade on environmental quality is positive but small. In our paper, we complement this literature by showing how trade liberalization in ‡uences the environment through …rms' relocation strategies (rather than through technological-upgrading behavior) in an imperfectly competitive economy. Speci…cally, we show that the level of trade costs in ‡uences both the level 3 Taking into account the …xed cost to set up a plant, Motta and Thisse (1994) demonstrate that such a relocation is less likely to occur. 4 Agglomeration forces stem from the assumptions of increasing returns to scale and asymmetric market sizes. 5 Empirical evidence related to the pollution haven hypothesis is also mixed (Ederington et al., 2005; Jeppesen et al. 2002; Eskeland and Harrison, 2003) . Interestingly, Levinson and Taylor (2008) raise several methodological issues that help explain why empirical studies have di¢ culties in demonstrating the existence of this e¤ect. 6 Therefore, the in ‡uence of di¤erences in factor endowment can dominate the impact of di¤erences in environmental policy on comparative advantage.
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of global emissions in the absence of a carbon tax and the ability of such a policy instrument to improve environmental quality. Importantly, our theoretical contribution also allows for the analysis of how global environmental measures a¤ect international trade patterns. We isolate a novel e¤ect of the carbon tax on trade patterns that is not due to regulation externalities among countries competing for FDIs or capital.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we develop a model of trade with …rms that di¤ers with respect to …rms' marginal cost and emission intensity and describe the outcome in the short run, when …rms are immobile. In section 3, we describe the location choice made by …rms in the long run, when clean …rms bear a higher net marginal cost.
In section 4, we analyze the ability of the global carbon tax to reduce global emissions.
Finally, we explore the e¢ ciency of the carbon tax when it is set at such a high level that dirty …rms su¤er a higher net marginal cost. The …nal section concludes the paper.
The model
We consider an economy with two countries (i = H; F ), two production factors (labor l and physical capital n) and two sectors in which …rms produce two homogeneous goods: i) an industrial good x with a polluting technology and ii) a numéraire good z whose production does not yield carbon emissions. Country H is supposed to host a share > 1=2 of total population l, and each individual is equally endowed with one unit of labor and n=l unit of capital. Residents work and consume in the country they live in but invest their capital in the country producing the highest return. Finally, we assume a supranational authority that implements a global carbon tax t on per-unit carbon emissions.
Preferences
For analytical tractability, we assume that workers share the same quasi-linear utility function u i with respect to the numéraire z and the manufactured good x, both goods being homogeneous. 
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where a > 0, x i is the individual consumption level of the manufactured good, z i is the individual consumption of the numéraire, z is the individual endowment in the numéraire, w i the national wage rate, and r the world net return rate to capital. We assume that the initial endowment z is large enough for the individual consumption of the numéraire to be strictly positive at the market outcome. Finally, captures the individual damage arising from the total emissions of the manufacturing sector (E), which are assumed to spill over across the two countries.
Given (1) and (2), the individual demand x i for the manufactured good is given by
Technology and market structure
Good z is produced under constant returns to scale and perfect competition. Speci…cally, one unit of labor is required to produce one unit of output. Moreover, this good is costlessly traded and considered as the numéraire. Thus, its price as well as the individual wage rate are equal to one in each country as soon as this sector is active in both countries, i.e., w i = 1; i = H; F:
By contrast, good x is produced under increasing returns to scale and yields carbon emissions that di¤er across …rms. We consider two types of …rms in particular, clean (c) and dirty (d), whose per-unit levels of carbon emission are given by " k with k = c; d. Pollution is considered a global public bad. In other words, the utility loss induced by one unit of emissions from country i is the same wherever individuals are located. Indeed, CO 2 emissions are considered a global problem that justi…es an internationally coordinated mitigation policy such as a global carbon tax.
Each type of …rm requires one unit of capital to produce any amount of good x. The marginal requirement in labor can be viewed as a pollution abatement cost that varies across …rms. There is a share of dirty …rms whose marginal requirement in labor is normalized to zero (because they do not abate pollution) and whose per-unit emission level is given by " d . By contrast, the remaining 1 share of …rms are clean and pollute less, " c < " d , because of their 6 marginal requirement of m > 0 units of labor. Abatement costs usually quantify di¤erent types of expenditures for pollution abatement. They may involve design costs for a new process of production but also managerial e¤ort for the required paperwork. In our paper, for simplicity, we assume a …xed amount of capital in each …rm, but the abatement may change the intensity of use of this unit of capital per unit of labor, ultimately changing the labor requirement for each unit of good x produced.
Finally, we consider that the manufactured good is costly traded. Each …rm incurs a trade cost of > 0 units of the numéraire per unit of good x shipped between the two countries.
Short-run equilibrium
In the short-run equilibrium, the location of each type of …rm in each country is given. There are n h …rms located in country H, and the rest, n n h ; are located in F . Labor, capital and goods markets are cleared. Firms in the manufacturing sector produce under Cournot competition.
Product markets are segmented because of trade costs (as in Brander and Krugman, 1983); that is, each …rm determines a speci…c quantity to trade to the country in which its product is sold. Thus, the net pro…ts of a k-type …rm (k = c; d) located in country i selling its good in country i and country j; are given by
ii is the quantity the …rm supplies to domestic consumers and x k ij is the quantity it sells to foreign consumers. Moreover, r i is the rental rate of capital in country i, which is equalized across countries due to capital mobility r H = r F = r. The …rst-order condition for clean …rms yields the following output choices:
for a …rm located in country H, and
for a …rm located in country F. Mirror expressions hold for dirty …rms, m being replaced by 0 and " c by " d : Solving the market-clearing condition for each country, we obtain the equilibrium prices p i in the short run:
where ! = (1 )(m + t" c )+ t" d represents the average marginal cost after taxation. The di¤erence in prices is p h p f = (n f n h )=(n + 1).
Before describing the equilibrium output, some comments are in order. First, the price level in a country decreases with the number of …rms located in the country as competition becomes …ercer. Second, the distribution of …rms between the two technologies modulates the price level through its e¤ect on the average marginal cost. Indeed, we have
Intuitively, the price level increases with the share of clean …rms (@p i =@ < 0) in the economy as long as their marginal cost is higher than the marginal cost of dirty …rms. Although this is always the case in the absence of carbon tax t, the reverse may hold when the supranational authority determines its implementation. More precisely, @p i =@ > 0 holds if and only if
Third, we observe that the implementation of a positive carbon tax yields higher prices:
This tax incidence e¤ect is proportional to the average emission intensity (1 )" c + " d .
In particular, the incidence of the carbon tax will be strong when the manufacturing sector is mainly composed of dirty …rms. Despite this tax incidence e¤ect on price, it is straightforward to determine whether the implementation of the carbon tax always deteriorates the margin of the most polluting …rms, which also holds for the less polluting …rms if and only if
Because it is more realistic to consider that the tax incidence e¤ect is not strong enough for the impact of the carbon tax on …rms'margin to be negative, we assume hereafter that the latter inequality holds.
Despite the positive impact of trade costs on the price level (because trade costs protect against foreign competition), the overall impact of trade costs on the export margin is negative.
At 
After performing calculations, we obtain the following:
Hereafter, we assume a > m(n + 1) t (n(" d " c ) " c ) such that the abovementioned thresholds are positive regardless of the carbon tax level.
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Then, substituting for the equilibrium prices in the output choices, we obtain the equilibrium output in the short run. For clean …rms, the quantities are described as follows:
for a …rm located in country H and
for a …rm located in country F .
Mirror expressions hold for dirty …rms, for which " c is replaced by For clarity, we analyze the e¤ect of the carbon tax under the two scenarios (i) and (ii)
separately. We start in sections 3 and 4 by analyzing the scenario in which the carbon tax remains within the interval t < t, implying that clean …rms have the highest marginal cost.
Scenario (ii) is discussed in Appendix 4.
Long-run spatial equilibrium
In this section, we assume that t 2 (0; t] : Equation (3) indicates that this scenario may occur because the marginal labor requirement of clean …rms is large, the di¤erence in the per-unit emissions of the two types of …rms is not large and/or the carbon tax is low. Consequently, 0 trade (t) > trade (t); yielding the following simpli…ed trade condition:
In the long run, the number of …rms located in each country is endogenously determined by the condition that no …rm has an incentive to move. Moreover, the equilibrium rate of return to capital is determined by the zero-pro…t condition. In other words, the operating pro…ts evaluated at the equilibrium prices and quantities are completely absorbed by the return to capital, and no …rm can pro…tably enter the market. Formally, we have
Similar expressions hold for dirty …rms, for which " c is replaced by 
where a (n + 1)(m + t" c ) + n! and a (8) and (9), we can analyze how these variables react to a change in the spatial distribution of k -type …rms, s k , or in the distribution of …rms across types, . It is straightforward to verify that d k =ds k < 0 8k = c; d due to higher competition. Thus, location equilibria are stable.
The carbon tax triggers two opposing forces on the spatial di¤erence in return to capital:
In the presence of market size asymmetry, > 1=2, the tax incidence force exacerbates the di¤erence in returns to capital across countries, whereas the impact of the carbon tax on the marginal cost has the opposite sign. The net impact is always negative for dirty …rms, whose tax burden is raised by their high emissions, which is also the case for clean …rms as long as the e¤ect on the marginal cost dominates that on the tax incidence, as we assumed in (4).
Consequently, we have
More importantly, a carbon tax erodes the bene…t of being in the large country more for the dirty …rms than for the clean ones :
Hence, when di¤erent market sizes are considered, a global carbon tax is not a spatially neutral policy instrument. Because the tax amount paid is proportional to the individual output (the carbon tax is a quantity tax), the location in the large market becomes more costly and some …rms may relocate towards the small one with the aim of reducing the tax burden. Consequently, the introduction of such taxation increases the attractiveness of the small country. This mechanism takes place in the presence of homogeneous technologies (Exbrayat et al, 2013) and is further accentuated for dirty …rms when heterogeneous technologies coexist.
Finaly, we check that
which is negative because (3). Hence, because of a scale economies e¤ect, the spatial di¤erence in net return to capital between the large and small countries is higher for dirty …rms that keep enjoying the lowest marginal cost after taxation. Because r c is always smaller than r d , the long-run equilibrium location of …rms cannot involve an interior con…guration with a partial coagglomeration between the two countries for each type of …rms, that is, r c = r d = 0. Importantly, all …rms can never agglomerate in the small country because for n h = 0;
we have r c > 0 and r d > 0; implying that each …rm, whether dirty or clean, has an incentive to move to the large country.
We are now in a position to describe location equilibria in the long run. For this purpose, let us …rst de…ne the equilibrium spatial con…guration of …rms when a carbon tax is absent.
We …rst demonstrate in Appendix 1 that n 2n h 2 + 1 is negative such that the spatial di¤erence in return to capital decreases with trade costs, regardless of the type of …rm (see (8) and (9)). Therefore, let us de…ne the following:
where a and c are obtained by requiring r c = 0 at spatial con…gurations (s c = 1;
and (s c = 0; s d = 1), respectively, whereas d is obtained by requiring r d = 0 at spatial con-
To de…ne the possible spatial con…gurations, let us consider the following:
Then, as the level of trade cost decreses because of the process of trade integration, the possible spatial con…gurations are as follows: (iv) co-agglomeration in the larger country ( 1; 1) when 6 a .
We prove in Appendix 1 that d < trade such that all of the abovementioned spatial patterns are compatible with the trade feasibility condition. 8 To understand this result, recall the location forces that explain why we move from the most dispersed spatial pattern to more 
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force; however, decreasing trade costs weakens this force, whereas it ampli…es the agglomeration force. This reasoning helps explain the shift from spatial con…guration (i) to (ii), (ii) to (iii) and from (iii) to (iv). During this process, dirty …rms are the …rst ones to move toward the larger country. Indeed, they have the lowest marginal cost and thus are both more attracted by the large country and less sensitive to the higher competition within this country.
We now turn attention to the long-run equilibrium location in the presence of a carbon tax.
Because the introduction of a carbon tax modi…es the spatial di¤erences in return to capital, the threshold levels of trade costs are now expressed by
for any t , and each one of this threshold values of decreases with t. Consequently, the higher the carbon tax is, the smaller the trade cost threshold that triggers the shift from one spatial con…guration to the other becomes. Thus, abstracting for a moment from the trade feasibility condition, a positive carbon tax reduces the attractiveness of the larger country (see equation (10)). Indeed, the carbon tax is a quantity tax that ultimately reduces the incentive to locate in the larger country to produce on a larger scale. In other words, even when levied at the same rate, the carbon tax distorts the location choices of heterogeneous mobile …rms.
Similarly to the scenario involving a zero carbon tax, we can now de…ne spatial con…gura-tions that may arise (see Figure 1 ). For this purpose, let us consider the following:
It follows that the possible spatial con…gurations are as follows: (b) if t 1 < t t 2 ; then spatial con…gurations (1; 1), (s t c ; 1), (0; 1) are equilibria locations; (c) if > (3n + 1) = (4n + 2) and t 2 < t 6 t 3 or if < (3n + 1) = (4n + 2) and t 2 < t 6 t, then spatial con…gurations (1; 1) and (s t c ; 1) are location equilibria; (d) if > (3n + 1) = (4n + 2) and t > t 3 ; then the only location equilibrium is (1; 1) .
The foregoing proposition states that low levels of the carbon tax, i.e., t t 1 ; leave the type of spatial con…gurations that would arise in the absence of any carbon tax unchanged.
By contrast, as the carbon taxes exceeds the threshold value t 1 ; certain spatial con…gurations with trade cease to be stable equilibria because international trade ceases to be pro…table.
This result can be explained as follows. Di¤erent spatial con…gurations arise depending on the weight of two traditional forces shaping the location choices: the market size and the intensity of competition. Introducing a carbon tax weakens the market size e¤ect. As a result, the higher the carbon tax is, the smaller each of the threshold values of trade costs becomes (with
. Thus, ceteris paribus, Corollary 1 A global carbon tax weakens agglomeration forces and favors the emergence of dispersed equilibria of …rms'location.
As discussed in section 3, this e¤ect has repercussions for the level of pollution in both countries.
However, this is not the end of the story. On the one hand, a global carbon tax reduces most the trade conditions that de…ne agglomerated con…guration favoring disperstion; on the other, the tax does render the trade condition more binding (d trade =dt < 0) such that threshold values c (t) and d (t) might become higher than trade . In this case, the global carbon tax (in the presence of strong asymmetry in country size) works againts dispersion. In fact, the most dispersed spatial con…gurations become incompatible with the trade condition, whereas they are compatible without such a tax. We call this the no-trade e¤ect, which occurs when t > t 1 (i.e., d (t) > trade ), when t > t 2 (i.e., c (t) > trade ) or t > t 3 (i.e., a (t) > trade ). (right panel), respectively. We summarize the result as follows:
Corollary 2 A high global carbon tax favors agglomeration when market sizes are strongly asymmetric.
Hence, introducing a carbon tax may crucially a¤ect the set of possible location equilibria and, in turn, the level of emissions. Now, the level of pollution corresponding to each spatial con…guration remains to be analyzed.
Pollution
To proceed with the analysis of global pollution, we evaluate total emissions stemming from each spatial con…guration when t = 0 and t > 0. Considering these two cases is essential for the identi…cation of various e¤ects of a carbon tax on pollution. 
Global emissions in the absence of taxation
The function of global emissions for a given spatial distribution of clean and dirty …rms (E c +E d )
can be expressed as follows:
where s d > s c regardless of the equilibrium spatial con…guration as long as t 2 (0; t]. We can now incorporate the equilibrium values of s c and s d to analyze the evolution of global emissions as we move from one spatial con…guration to another.
Comparing the level of global emissions at the spatial con…guration i) with ii), ii) with iii), and …nally iii) with iv), at the market equilibrium, we obtain the following: 
Global emissions in the presence of a carbon tax
We can now analyze the environmental e¤ects of the implementation of a global carbon tax.
To address this issue, we start with the spatial con…gurations (1; 1) and (0; 1): E t (1; 1) = E (1; 1) t and E t (0; 1) = E (0; 1) t
We check that is positive under the assumption (4), such that the carbon tax reduces the global level of emissions. Regarding these two spatial con…gurations, the reduction in emissions is exclusively driven by the adjustment of the individual output of each type of …rm (becausẽ
. This Pigouvian e¤ect amounts to t . Turning our attention to total emissions in the two other spatial con…gurations such that at least one type of …rm is partially agglomerated in the larger country. , we obtain
Again, the implementation of a carbon tax clearly reduces emissions. However, it does so through both a Pigouvian e¤ect (captured by ) and a relocation e¤ect (captured by and ).
Indeed, recall thats Finally, let us analyze the evolution of global emissions as we move along the equilibrium path of spatial con…gurations. Assume for a moment that the carbon tax does not exceed the threshold value t 1 and thus bilateral trade ‡ows may be observed under all four spatial con…g-urations. We can rank global emissions along the equilibrium path of spatial con…gurations as follows:
Therefore, although the function is shifted down because of the e¢ ciency of the carbon tax, global emissions follows the same pattern as in the absence of it: They increase with trade liberalization and with a more agglomerated pattern in the larger market (see. Figure 2 ). However, note that the magnitude of the decrease in emissions strongly depends on the initial spatial equilibrium and whether this spatial pattern is stable to the introduction of the carbon tax. Indeed, taxing emissions a¤ects the threshold levels of trade costs, which all decrease and thus shift to the left. As a consequence, certain initial spatial con…gurations become unstable, and some …rms may relocate to keep their pro…tability unchanged. This is the relocation e¤ect that arises when the trade cost belongs to the intervals ( a (t) ; a ), ( c (t) ; c ) or
It can be observed that this e¤ect is large, and thus ampli…es the e¢ ciency of the carbon tax, when the spatial pattern shifts from the co-agglomeration (1; 1) or perfect selection (0; 1) to a pattern that combines partial selection for one type of …rm and agglomeration for the other ((s c ; 1) or (0; s d )). For these two con…gurations, Pigouvian and relocation e¤ects accumulate and reinforce the e¤ect of the tax on pollution.
For example, consider the shift from (1; 1) to (s c ; 1). The relocation of some clean …rms to the smaller market has two consequences. First, the new spatial distribution of clean …rms 20 is more environmentally friendly because dE t c =ds c > 0. Second, the most polluting …rms, fully concentrated in the larger market, face less competition in this market and thereby produce and pollute more (dE t d =ds c < 0). Put di¤erently, the e¤ect on environment is positive for clean …rms, whereas it is negative for dirty ones. It is straightforward to check that jdE t c =ds c j > jdE It is worth stressing that the third e¤ect concerns the most environmentally friendly con…g-urations. As stated by Proposition 1, scenario (iv) will no longer be among the set of location equilibria for this level of the carbon tax. Thus, the pollution curves appear as shown below:
We summarize our results in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 A relatively small global carbon tax, t t 1 ; decreases the total level of pollution through a Pigouvian e¤ect and a relocation e¤ect, leaving all spatial con…gurations to arise as equilibrium locations. Under a su¢ ciently high level of the global carbon tax, t > t 3 ; the tax renders trade inconvenient, favoring agglomeration.
To conclude, we show that as long as the carbon tax does not exceed a threshold value (namely t 1 ), the policy has only positive e¤ects for the environment. It lowers emissions in any spatial con…guration and induces environmentally friendly spatial relocations. Nonetheless, there exists a threshold value, i.e., t 1 , above which the e¤ects of taxation are more complex because the set of candidate equilibria is modi…ed. More precisely, the most environmentally friendly spatial con…gurations can be removed.
Conclusion
This paper investigates the ability of a fully harmonized carbon tax to curb carbon emissions in a globalized economy characterized by an uneven spatial distribution of heterogeneous …rms.
Our results challenge the claim that a global carbon tax could succeed in improving the quality of environment without raising competitiveness concerns.
We …rst show that regardless of its level, a global carbon tax might encourage some …rms to relocate their activity. Importantly, the level of the carbon tax matters for the direction of the relocation and its impact on global emissions. When the carbon tax is low enough, …rms relocate to the smaller country to pay lower taxes by reducing their output. In addition to the Pigouvian e¤ect of the carbon tax, this relocation reduces global emissions by promoting a less concentrated spatial distribution of activities. Interestingly, this relocation strategy never involves clean and dirty …rms at the same time. Speci…cally, low-cost …rms relocate to the smaller country at an earlier stage of trade liberalization than high-cost …rms do. Indeed, because they su¤er a higher post-tax marginal cost, the latter are both less attracted by the large country and more sensitive to the higher competition within this country. If, however, the carbon tax is too high, then …rms'pro…tability on the export market can be threatened, and they react by relocating to the larger country to maintain their export activity. In such a case, the Pigouvian e¤ect of the carbon tax can be counteracted by the relocation e¤ect, giving rise to a more polluting spatial distribution of …rms.
Appendices Appendix 1: Equilibrium spatial locations in absence of carbon tax
To prove that spatial con…gurations (i),(ii),(iii) and (iv) are equilibria locations when t = 0, we simply need to prove that the trade condition evaluated at t = 0 is such that trade (0) The …rst inequality is true because n > 1 and < 1: The second expression is positive as long
; which is true by assumption. In fact the second expression is positive for = To show which are the candidate equilibrium locations when t < t, we investigate the sign of r d and r c in the admissible set of ; namely < trade : Two cases arise:
; then, r d > r c > 0: Hence, the candidate equilibrium locations that can arise in the feasible set is only scenario (i), namely coagglomeration in country H. However, this cannot be an equilibrium location, because coagglomeration in the large country s c = s d = 1 is in contradiction with the condition n h < n 2
; then, the candidate equilibrium locations are all four spatial con…gurations 9 . We know that for any t 2 [0; t) ; d (t) > c (t): These two thresholds as well as the trade condition trade (t) are monotonic decreasing functions of t: Then, to spot the location equilibria, for any t 2 [0; t) ; we shall investigate the value of the trade condition for t (knowing from Appendix 1 that for t = 0; trade > d (0): If the trade condition at t; is higher than c ( t); then all four spatial con…gurations are equilibrium location for any admissible and t: First notice that at t we have
while the corresponding trade cost threshold is
which are both positive.
Taking the di¤erence trade ( t) c ( t); we have
which is negatively signed (implying c ( t) > trade ( t)) if and only if the numerator
It can be easily checked that if [ (n 2n h 2 + 1)] > 0 then
is positive due to positivity of trade ( t). It follows that if c ( t) > trade ( t); and for any
Then, in the interval t 2 [0; t) ; the curve trade (t) intercepts once the curve d (t). Call this intercept t 1 . And trade (t) intercepts once the curve c (t): Call this second intercept t 2 :
9 Notice that, as we said, r c < r d < 0 is never an equilibrium location because it does not satisfy the condition n h n 2 Let us now analyze the position of a ( t) with respect to the other threshold values. We …rst verify that:
is positive. Moreover, the di¤erence between trade ( t) and a ( t) writes:
We verify that a ( t) 7 trade ( t) when 7 (3n + 1) = (4n + 2). Then, the curve trade (t) intercepts once the curve a (t) and we call this intercept t 3 :Then, t 3 lies in the interval t 2 [0; t) if > (3n + 1) = (4n + 2) whereas it lies in the interval t 2 [ t; +1) otherwise. Moreover, we check
Therefore, we conclude that t 1 < t 2 < t 3 < t when > (3n + 1) = (4n + 2) whereas t 1 < t 2 < t < t 3 when < (3n + 1) = (4n + 2).
Consequently, for t < t 1 ; trade (t) > d (t) (recall that for t = 0; we proved in Appendix 1 If < (3n + 1) = (4n + 2), then all carbon tax values that lie in the interval [0; t) are lower than t 3 . Therefore, only a (t) lie in the admissible set of values, implying that con…gurations (i) and (ii) are the only equilibrium scenarii. If, however, > (3n + 1) = (4n + 2), the equilibrium con…gurations depend on wether the carbon tax is higher or lower than t 3 . Con…gurations (i) and (ii) are the only equilibrium scenarii when t 2 t t 3 , whereas only con…guration (i) arises as an equilibrium scenario when t > t 3 .
Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 4
To show which are the candidate equilibrium locations t > t, we investigate the sign of r 
Given the positivity of 0 trade ( t), both expressions are positive and
. We now take the di¤erence between 0 trade ( t) and the above thresholds. We obtain:
The …rst expression is negatively signed due to positivity of 0 trade ( t). By contrast, the sign of the second expression depends on the asymmetry of market size. Speci…cally, we verify that 0 trade ( t) 7 0 a ( t) when ? (3n + 1) = (4n + 2). Thus, the ranking of threshold values with respect to the trade condition is
To complete the analysis, we now compare these thresholds with the trade condition when the carbon tax takes the maximum value t max . We verify that:
is negative due to positivity of
. Therefore at the maximum value of the carbon tax, the only spatial equilibrium compatible with the trade condition is coagglomeration in the larger country (1; 1).
To summarize, 0 trade (t) is lower than 0 d (t) and 0 c (t) for all t 2 ( t; t max ) whereas 0 trade (t) can be higher or lower than 0 a (t) when the size asymmetry is not too large. As all thresholds value are monotonic decreasing functions with respect to the carbon tax, this implies that the 26 curve 0 trade (t) intercepts once the curve 0 a (t) when < (3n + 1) = (4n + 2) : Let us call t 4 this intercept that lies in the interval t 2 ( t; t max ). Then, we verify that
We can now de…ne which candidate location equilibrium are compatible with the trade condition over the interval ( t; t max ). If > (3n + 1) = (4n + 2),
c (t) for all t 2 ( t; t max ), so that (1; 1) is the only location equilibrium compatible with the trade condition. If, however, < (3n + 1) = (4n + 2), then spatial con…gurations (1; 1) and (1; s d ) can arise in equilibrium when t t 4 whereas coagglomeration (1; 1) is the only spatial con…guration equilibrium when t > t 4 .
Dirty …rms have the highest marginal cost
In this section, we assume that the carbon tax reaches such a high level that the clean …rms now enjoy the lowest (post-tax) marginal cost, that is t > t. Then, we verify that 0 trade < trade , yielding the following simpli…ed trade condition:
Long run spatial equilibrium
The inequality t > t implies that the spatial di¤erence in return to capital between the large and the small country is now higher for clean …rms (that is, r c > r d ). In other terms, because the carbon tax is high enough, dirty …rms have now lower incentives to locate in the large country than clean ones.
As a consequence, the equilibrium location of …rms cannot involve an interior con…guration for each type of …rms, that is r c = r d = 0. Moreover, we check that expressions (a (n + 1)(m + t" c ) + n!) and (a (n + 1)t" d + n!) entering r c and r d are positive for all < 0 trade (t). Thus, the complete coagglomeration of …rms in the small country cannot arise because r c (n h = 0) > 0 and r
Finally, we show in Appendix 3 that (n 2n h 2 + 1) < 0 so that r c and r d are decreasing in . Thus, we can de…ne threshold values of trade cost that determine the switch 27 from a spatial con…guration to another. For that purpose, let us de…ne : which con…rms that imposing a carbon tax higher than the threshold t erodes the attractiveness of the large country for dirty …rms.
Then, the possible spatial con…gurations (ŝ 
t).
Clearly, the decline in trade cost induces the relocation of …rms from the smaller to the larger country. The mechanisms driving this progressive agglomeration to the larger country are similar as when the carbon tax is lower than t: trade integration weakens the dispersion force (due to competition) whereas it strengthens the agglomeration force (due to the market size advantage of country H). The only di¤erence is that as clean …rms now enjoy the lowest net marginal cost, they are the …rst ones to relocate to the larger country when trade costs Proof. See Appendix 3.
When the carbon tax is higher than t, only the most concentrated spatial con…gurations ( 1; 1) and (1;ŝ t d ) can arise in equilibrium. This is not surprising as we show in section 4 that the rise in the carbon tax (from 0 to t) triggers the exclusion of the most dispersed spatial con…gurations.
The intuition for this result is the same as in section 4, and comes from the no-trade e¤ect.
The carbon tax renders the trade condition even more binding (d 
Pollution
Let us now analyze how global pollution evolves as the economy moves from spatial con…g-uration Therefore, trade integration is still detrimental to the environment when t > t. Moreover, it is readily veri…ed that a (t) > 0 a (t) and dE (s t c ; 1) =d > dE (1;ŝ t d ) =d . These properties allow us to illustrate the pollution paths with respect to the level of trade cost under the three main cases: absence of taxation, t < t and t > t. Precisely, the evolution of pollution when t < t is depicted by making the assumption that < (3n + 1) = (4n + 2) and t 2 < t while < (3n + 1) = (4n + 2) and t < t 4 are assumed to be checked when t > t. and (s c ; 1) cannot be equilibria. As a consequence, some dirty …rms relocate in the small country with a strong and positive environmental outcome.
As said before, trade liberalization is at the origin of more pollution whatever the location equilibrium of the economy. However, observe that when the two types of …rms are not fully agglomerated in the large country, the detrimental e¤ect of trade liberalization on pollution is stronger when the level of taxation is high and above t. Indeed, in this case, trade liberalization acts as an agglomeration force of the most polluting …rms in the large country. In contrast, the environmental consequences are less important when t < t because these are the less polluting …rms that relocate toward this country.
